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CALIFORNIA RUSHES IN—KEEPING WATER INSTREAM
FOR FISHERIES WITHOUT FEDERAL LAW
PAUL STANTON KIBEL*
INTRODUCTION
Many of California’s anadromous and freshwater fisheries are
now in sharp decline.1 Salmon and steelhead trout runs throughout the
state, as well as the delta smelt, are currently designated as endangered
under federal law.2
In addition to the biodiversity loss associated with the decline of
these fisheries, the collapse of California’s salmon stocks has had severe
economic impacts on the state’s commercial fishery sector—from the
fishermen who catch the salmon, to those who service salmon fishing
boats, to those who ultimately sell salmon to customers in markets and
restaurants.3 All of these people whose jobs and livelihoods are involved
in California’s fishing sector have taken a financial hit as the state’s
salmon stocks have plummeted.4 As explained by the Golden Gate Salmon
Association, an organization that works on behalf of commercial salmon
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1 San Luis & Delta-Medota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 592–96 (9th Cir. 2014);
Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Guitierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127–28 (E.D.
Cal. 2008); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 328–31 (E.D.
Cal. 2007).
2 San Luis & Delta-Medota Water Auth., 747 F.3d at 592–96; Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fisher-
men’s Ass’n, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1127–28; Nat. Res. Def. Council, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 328–31.
3 Mike Hudson, Hudson Fish Company, Remarks at the California Water Law Symposium
at the University of San Francisco School of Law (Jan. 21, 2017) (notes on file with author).
4 Id.
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fishermen in Northern California, “For many of us, salmon provides the
income we use to keep a roof over our family’s head.”5
In recent decades, commercial fishermen, Native American tribes,
and other fishery conservation stakeholders have relied extensively on
a set of federal laws and federal agencies to keep water instream for
California fisheries.6 However, following the results of the November
2016 federal election, with a Republican-controlled Congress and a new
President that has pledged to reduce the scope of federal environmental
protections, it is foreseeable that these federal laws and federal agencies
may play a more limited role in this regard in the near term.7 Under these
circumstances, commercial fishermen and other stakeholders focused on
conserving California’s fisheries may increasingly turn their attention to
state law and state agencies.8
This shift in focus for fishery stakeholders in California, from the
federal law to state law protections, may have been prompted by the
November 2016 election, but it is part of a broader and more long-standing
debate about the constitutional parameters and policy implications of fed-
eralism for natural resource regulation. There is a well-developed body
of legal scholarship that addresses such federalism questions as the dis-
tinction between federal law floors and federal law ceilings in the natural
resource regulatory arena, the ways that federal law floors can prevent a
race to the bottom in terms of state natural resource standards, and the
ways that federal law floors can preserve a place for state law innovation
in terms of natural resource management.9 More recently, with the election
of Donald Trump, there has been legal scholarship and policy debate about
what has been called the “new progressive federalism” and the opportuni-
ties to use sources of state law and constitutional restraints on the scope
5 Why We Work for Salmon?, GOLDEN GATE SALMON ASS’N, http://www.goldengatesalmon
.org/why-we-work-for-salmon [https://perma.cc/2BWU-3NVF] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
6 See text accompanying footnotes infra 22–77, discussing federal statutes and case law
relied on to keep water instream for fisheries.
7 Rachel Zwillinger, Attorney for Defenders of Wildlife, & Cliff Lee, Attorney with Natural
Resource Section of California Attorney General’s Office, Presentations at Bar Association
of San Francisco panel on Coming Changes in Water Law Practice: California Law Advances
as Federal Law Recedes (Apr. 13, 2017) [hereinafter Presentations of Zwillinger & Lee].
8 Id.
9 See generally William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, EMORY U. SCH. OF L. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES
(Res. Paper No. 07-9, 2007); Kristen H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federal-
ism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L. J. 159 (2006); Jerome M. Organ, Limitation on
State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental Standards More Stringent than Federal
Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373 (1995).
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of federal law to advance policies often associated with the political left.10
Although this Article posits that preventing the decline of fisheries (par-
ticularly commercial fisheries such as salmon) is an economic policy objec-
tive that cuts across traditional right/left political categories, the fisheries
conservation and federalism questions considered in this Article can be un-
derstood as part of the larger field of legal scholarship on the respective
roles of state law and federal law when natural resources are involved.
This Article examines the ways that federal law and federal agen-
cies currently provide a legal basis to keep water instream for California
fisheries, and the ways that California water law may be in a position to
fill the regulatory gap that may be left if federal water law and federal
agencies recede.
Following the introduction, Part I of the Article identifies the dif-
ferent ways that instream flow affects California fisheries. Part II then
surveys federal laws and federal agencies that have traditionally supported
efforts to keep water instream for California fisheries. In Part III, the Arti-
cle presents examples of how the scope of federal laws affecting instream
flow may be reduced by the administration of Donald Trump and the new
Congress, and discusses the California laws and California agencies that
may be increasingly relied upon to secure instream flows for California
fisheries in the event this reduced scope of federal law occurs. Using H.R.
23 (otherwise known as the Gaining Responsibility on Water Act of 2017)11
as a focal point, Part IV then assesses proposed Congressional legislation
to limit the application of California water law, the response of the Califor-
nia Attorney General to this proposed legislation,12 and a July 2017
California Supreme Court decision13 that may shed light on whether this
proposed legislation, if enacted, is likely to survive a legal challenge. The
last Part then notes how the federalism issues raised by H.R. 23 and the
potential roles for California law to maintain instream flow for fisheries
relate to the existing legal scholarship distinguishing federal ceilings and
10 See generally Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACY J. 37
(2012) [hereinafter Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism]; Heather K. Gerken, Slipping
the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HAR. L. REV. 85 (2014) [hereinafter Gerken, Slipping the
Bonds of Federalism]; Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of
Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57 (2014).
11 H.R. 23, 115th Cong. (2017).
12 Letter from Xavier Becerra, Cal. Att’y Gen., to Paul Ryan, House Speaker, and Nancy
Pelosi, House Minority Leader (July 11, 2017), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments
/press_releases/Representatives%20Ryan%20and%20Pelosi_H.R.%2023%2020170711.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YKV3-QGJ5] [hereinafter Letter from Xavier Becerra].
13 Eel River v. N. Coast R.R. Auth., 399 P.3d 37 (Cal. 2017).
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federal floors in the natural resource field and to proposals for a new pro-
gressive federalism in response to the November 2016 election results.
Although the main focus of this Article is on California fisheries,
California water law and California water agencies, much of the analysis
set forth may also be pertinent to other states considering their options
for keeping water instream under the new President and new Congress.
By studying California’s response, other states may be able to develop
their own strategies for effectively deploying state law and state agencies
to maintain instream flow for fisheries regardless of what happens at the
federal level in the coming years.
I. WAYS THAT INSTREAM FLOW AFFECTS CALIFORNIA FISHERIES
There are multiple causes of anadromous and freshwater fisheries
decline in California but the best available science confirms that reduc-
tions in instream flow is a critical driver.14 There may be other non-flow
improvements that might also benefit certain fisheries—such as reduced
water pollution or reduced logging near salmon stream habitat—but the
best available science indicates that without increased instream flow such
non-flow improvements will do little to reverse the fisheries decline.15
In terms of maintaining healthy and biologically viable fish stocks
in California, the scientific consensus therefore is that there is no go with-
out the flow. The primary reasons are salinity, water temperature, and
slack-water conditions. To place these points in a more concrete geographic
setting and make them less abstract, we can consider how these factors
operate in California’s Bay Delta. The Bay Delta is where seawater push-
ing in from the Pacific Ocean and San Francisco Bay mixes with freshwa-
ter coming down from the Sacramento River and San Joaquin River.16
In terms of salinity, Bay Delta fisheries such as delta smelt have
evolved to survive in brackish waters but not in waters with high salinity
levels.17 With the reduction in freshwater flow due to upstream diversions
14 Comment Letter from Golden Gate University Center on Urban Environmental Law
(CUEL) on December 2013 Draft EIR/EIS for Proposed Bay Delta Conservation Plan
(BDCP) at 3, 5 (July 15, 2014).
15 Id. at 4–5, 13, 16–17.
16 Paul Stanton Kibel, The Public Trust Navigates California’s Bay Delta, 51 NAT. RES.
J. 35, 35 (2011) [hereinafter Kibel, The Public Trust Navigates California’s Bay Delta].
17 San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth., 747 F.3d 581 at 595; Paul Stanton Kibel, Sea
Level Rise, Saltwater Intrusion and Endangered Fisheries—Shifting Baselines for the Bay
Delta Conservation Plan, 38 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L & POL’Y J. 259, 263–65 (2015) [herein-
after Kibel, Sea Level Rise].
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and impoundment behind dams, ocean saltwater has pushed further into
the Bay Delta.18 The delta smelt now faces the prospect of extinction as
a result of rising salinity caused by seawater intrusion.19
In terms of temperature, Bay Delta cold-water fisheries such as
salmon and steelhead trout cannot survive in waters above 60 degrees
Fahrenheit and their numbers and health decline severely as water tem-
peratures climb into the upper 50s.20 In 2014 and 2015 during the recent
California drought, it is estimated that a high percentage of juvenile
salmon and steelhead trout died in the Sacramento River below Shasta
Dam, operated by the United States Bureau of Reclamation.21 The scien-
tific consensus is that the cause of this salmon die-off below Shasta Dam
was high instream temperatures.22 What accounted for these higher in-
stream temperatures? Reduced cold-water releases from Shasta Dam due
to increased water demand during the drought.23
In terms of slack-water conditions, low-flow stagnant rivers provide
conditions for the spread of algae and aquatic parasites that can kill fish.24
For example, looking beyond the Bay Delta, on the Klamath River in north-
ern California, low flows and stagnant instream waters during the summer
(due to upstream diversions) led to an outbreak of the Ich parasite that
decimated lower Klamath River salmon stocks.25
II. FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL AGENCIES AFFECTING INSTREAM
WATER FOR CALIFORNIA FISHERIES
There are at least six sources of federal law that have traditionally
provided a legal foundation to maintain instream flow for fisheries in
18 San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth., 747 F.3d at 595; Kibel, Sea Level Rise, supra
note 17, at 263–66.
19 San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth., 747 F.3d at 595–601, 637; Kibel, Sea Level
Rise, supra note 17, at 263–66.
20 Healing Troubled Waters: Preparing Trout and Salmon Habitat for a Changing Climate,
TROUT UNLIMITED at 3 (2007), https://www.tu.org/sites/default/files/science/pdfs/Healing
-Troubled-Waters-Preparing-Trout-and-Salmon-Habitat-for-a-Changing-Climate.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AKV9-HNUU].





24 U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, DRAFT LONG-TERM PLAN FOR PROTECTING LATE SUMMER
ADULT SALMON IN THE LOWER KLAMATH RIVER at 3 (Apr. 2015).
25 Id. at 1–3.
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California: the federal Clean Water Act;26 federal Endangered Species Act;27
federally recognized tribal fishing rights;28 the National Environmental
Policy Act;29 the Federal Power Act;30 and the federal Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act.31 The pertinent provisions of these federal laws, and their ef-
fects on California fisheries, are discussed below.
A. Federal Clean Water Act § 303—EPA Review of State Water
Quality Standards
Under § 303 of the federal Clean Water Act, states have authority
to propose “beneficial uses” for waterways and propose “water quality
standards” subject to review and approval by the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA”).32
Pursuant to § 303, California’s State Water Resources Control
Board has designated the “beneficial uses” for the Sacramento River, the
San Joaquin River, and the Bay Delta to include fish spawning, rearing,
and migration.33 In recent years, the EPA has pressed for enhanced com-
pliance with California’s water quality standards, particularly as they
relate to fisheries present in or that migrate through the Sacramento River,
the San Joaquin River, and the Bay Delta.34
More specifically, in 2014 the EPA sent a letter to its sister federal
agency the United States Bureau of Reclamation commenting on a Rec-
lamation proposal for changed operations for the Central Valley Project
in California.35 The EPA’s 2014 letter on the proposal for future Central
Valley Project operations stated:
[W]e are concerned that the actions proposed . . . may
result in violations of [the] Clean Water Act water quality
standards and further degrade the ecosystem . . . [T]he
primary premise of the [proposed action by United States
Bureau of Reclamation] appears to be the hypothesis that
26 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (2012).
27 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. (2012).
28 Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 547 (9th Cir. 1995).
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (2012).
30 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a et seq. (2012).
31 Clean Water Act § 303, codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2012).
32 Id.
33 Dan Bacher, Tunnel opponents applaud EPA’s scathing comment letter, DAILY KOS
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endangered and threatened fish population in the San
Francisco estuary can be protected from further degrada-
tion by habitat restoration without increasing freshwater
flow to the Estuary . . . The habitat restoration-only prem-
ise is inconsistent with broad scientific agreement . . . that
existing freshwater flow conditions in the San Francisco
Estuary are insufficient to protect the aquatic ecosystem
and multiple fish species, and that both increased fresh-
water flows and aquatic habitat restoration are needed to
restore ecosystem processes in the Bay Delta and protect
native and migratory fish populations.36
In response to issues raised in the 2014 EPA letter regarding com-
pliance with Clean Water Act § 303, California’s State Water Resources
Control Board is now preparing an update to the Bay Delta Water Qual-
ity Plan.37 As part of its update to the Bay Delta Water Quality Plan, in
September 2016 California’s State Water Resources Control Board pro-
posed base instream flows for the three main tributaries to San Joaquin
River—the Stanislaus, the Tuolumne, and the Merced Rivers.38 The pro-
posed base flows for the San Joaquin River tributaries are designed to
protect salmon by reducing the days when and locations where instream
temperatures exceed 60 degrees Fahrenheit.39
B. Endangered Species Act § 7—Biological Opinions for Salmon
and Delta Smelt
The United States Bureau of Reclamation operates the Central
Valley Project and the California Department of Water Resources oper-
ates the State Water Project.40 Both of these projects involve the operation
of water diversion facilities and on-stream storage dams in the Sacra-
mento River and San Joaquin River watersheds.41
36 Letter from the E.P.A. to Will Stelle, Reg’l Admin., West Coast Region Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv. on Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Bay Delta Conserva-
tion Plan (Aug. 26, 2014).
37 Paul Stanton Kibel, Truly a Watershed Event: California’s Water Board Proposes Base
Flows for the San Joaquin River Tributaries, CAL. WATER L. J. (2016).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See generally Coordinated Long-Term Operations of the Central Valley Project and State
Water Project: Project Description, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES.
(Aug. 2011) [hereinafter Coordinated Long-Term Operations].
41 See generally id.
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Pursuant to § 7 of the federal Endangered Species Act, in 2008 the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service issued its delta smelt Biological
Opinion for joint operations plan for the Central Valley Project and State
Water Project.42 Then in 2009, the National Marine Fisheries Service is-
sued its salmon Biological Opinion for joint operations plan for the Central
Valley Project and State Water Project.43 The 2008 and 2009 Biological
Opinions for delta smelt and salmon, respectively, contained “jeopardy de-
terminations” and included instream flow conditions to maintain salinity
(for delta smelt) and water temperature (for salmon).44
Agricultural water users filed suit to challenge the instream
flow/salinity provisions in the delta smelt Biological Opinion.45 In 2014,
this litigation concluded when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
instream flow/salinity conditions in the 2008 delta smelt Biological Opin-
ion.46 In San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Jewell, the Ninth
Circuit held:
[A]s the combined pumping operations of the SWP [State
Water Project]/CVP [Central Valley Project] remove hun-
dreds of gallons of fresh water from the Bay Delta, X2 [the
upper salinity level at which smelt can survive] . . . shifts
eastward toward the Delta. The Bi-Op determined that the
“long-term upstream shift in X2 . . . has caused a long-term
decrease in habitat area availability for the delta smelt.”47
In January 2015, the United States Supreme Court denied certio-
rari to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision in San Luis & Delta-Mendota
Water Authority v. Jewell.48
42 Memorandum from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv. on Transmittal of Formal Endan-
gered Species Act Consultation on the Coordinated Operations of the Central Valley
Project and State Water Project (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.fws.gov/sfbaydelta/documents
/SWP-CVP_OPs_BO_12-15_final_signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE3U-HL7J] [hereinafter
Memorandum from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv.].
43 Biological Opinion and Conference Opinion on the Long-Term Operations of the Central
Valley Project and State Water Project, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE SW. REGION
(June 4, 2009), http://www.westcoast.fisheries.noaa.gov/publications/Central_Valley/Water
20Operations/Operations,%20Criteria%20and%20Plan/nmfs_biological_and_conferenceopin
ion_on_the_long-term_operations_of_the_cvp_and_swp.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8ED-P4LA].
44 See Memorandum from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., supra note 42.
45 See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth., 747 F.3d at 599–601.
46 Id. at 616–17.
47 Id. at 622.
48 San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 948 (Jan. 12, 2015).
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C. Federal Tribal Fishing Rights—Flows to Maintain Salmon
The Trinity River is tributary to the Klamath River, and Lewiston
and Trinity Dams on the Trinity River are part of the Trinity River Division
of the federal Central Valley Project.49 The water stored in the reservoirs
behind Lewiston and Trinity Dams is diverted by pipeline out of the
Klamath-Trinity watershed, where it is deposited into the Sacramento
River for use by cities and farmers.50 As mentioned earlier, in past years,
slack water conditions on the lower Klamath River previously led to
outbreak of the Ich parasite that decimated salmon runs.51 These slack
water conditions were caused, in part, by minimal releases from Lewiston
and Trinity Dams.52
The reservations of the Hoopa and Yurok Tribes are located along
the Trinity River and Klamath River.53 In its 1995 decision in Parravano
v. Babbitt, the Ninth Circuit recognized the Hoopa and Yurok tribes’s
fishery rights under federal law to salmon on the Trinity and Klamath
Rivers.54 In this case, the federal government, acting as trustee for the
tribes, imposed restrictions on the ocean catch of salmon to ensure
enough fish returned to the areas along the reservation.55 The court in
Parravano upheld these ocean fishing restrictions, finding:
For generations, the Hoopa Valley and Yurok Indian tribes
have depended on the Klamath chinook salmon for their
nourishment and economic livelihood.56
. . . .
We have noted, with great frequency, that the federal gov-
ernment is the trustee of the Indian tribes’ rights, including
fishing rights. (Citation omitted). This trust responsibility
extends not just to the Interior Department, but attaches
to the federal government as a whole. (Citations omitted).
In particular, this court and the Interior Department have
49 U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 24, at 3.
50 Id. at 26.
51 Id. at 1–3.
52 Id. at 15.
53 Parravano v. Masten, 70 F.3d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 1995).
54 Id. at 547–48.
55 Id. at 547.
56 Id. at 542.
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recognized a trust obligation to protect the Yurok and
Hoopa Valley Tribes’ rights to harvest Klamath chinook.
(Citation omitted).57
. . . .
The Klamath chinook is an anadromous species. As a result,
successful preservation of the Tribes’ on-reservation fish-
ing rights must include regulation of ocean fishing of the
same resource. Indeed, allowing ocean fishing to take all
the chinook available for harvest before the salmon can mi-
grate upstream to the Tribes’ waters would offer no protec-
tion to the Indians’ fishing rights.58
In part to address the Yurok and Hoopa Valley Tribes’ fishing
rights recognized in the Parravano case, in 2015 the United States Bureau
of Reclamation released its draft of Long-Term Plan for Protecting Late
Summer Adult Salmon in the Lower Klamath River (and proposed en-
hanced releases from Lewiston and Trinity Dams to help prevent a
reoccurrence of the Ich parasite breakout that earlier damaged salmon
stocks in the Klamath River basin).59 The draft plan notes that the current
criteria require flow augmentation (additional releases from dams oper-
ated by the United States Bureau of Reclamation) in the lower Klamath
River “to a minimum of 2,500–2,800 cfs [cubic feet per second] when the
cumulative harvest of hinook salmon in the Yurok Tribal fishery in the
estuary areas meets or exceeds a total of 7,000 fish,60 and then recom-
mended increasing flow augmentation to a “minimum of 2,800 cfs” under
these same circumstances.61
Much like the ocean fishing restrictions that were the subject of
the Parravano decision, the Long-Term Plan for Protecting Late Summer
Adult Salmon in the Lower Klamath River is based on the position that
to meet its trustee obligations to the Yurok and Hoopa Valley Tribes, the
federal government must take appropriate actions to ensure a healthy
salmon fishery in tribal waters.62 More specifically, § 5 of the 2015 draft
57 Id. at 546.
58 Id. at 547.
59 See generally U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 24.
60 Id. at 17.
61 Id. at 9.
62 Id. at 23.
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Long-Term Plan for Protecting Late Summer Adult Salmon in the Lower
Klamath River on “Statutory Authority” states that the Bureau of Recla-
mation’s actions pursuant to the plan are “consistent with Reclamation’s
obligations to preserve tribal trust resources.”63
D. NEPA—Evaluation of Increased Flow Alternatives in
Environmental Impact Statements
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires envi-
ronmental impact statements (“EISs”) prepared by federal agencies to
evaluate a range of alternatives to avoid significant adverse impacts.64
More specifically, § 4332(2)(E) of NEPA provides that the range of alter-
natives evaluated in an EIS needs to address “unresolved conflicts” re-
garding significant environmental impacts (e.g., conflicts regarding the
effects of reduced instream flows on fisheries).65
The 2005 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in National
Audubon Society v. Department of the Navy is instructive on this ques-
tion.66 In this case, the Fourth Circuit reviewed a challenge to a NEPA
EIS prepared in connection with a decision to construct an aircraft training
facility adjacent to a national wildlife refuge.67 The Court found that the
EIS failed to comply with NEPA for, among other reasons, failing to sub-
stantively evaluate alternative locations other than one so close to pro-
tected wildlife resources:
We note at the outset that the proximity of the proposed
[aircraft facility] to the Pocosin Lakes National Wildlife
Refuge bears heavily on our inquiry in this case. We can-
not divorce this fact from the sufficiency of the agency’s
environmental analysis . . . The Navy’s “hard look” in this
case must therefore take particular care to how its actions
will affect the unique biological features of this congressio-
nally protected area . . . The Navy did not meet this burden.
The deficiencies in each of the Navy’s analysis would not,
on their own, be sufficient to invalidate the EIS. But a re-
view of the various components of the EIS taken together
63 Id.
64 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
65 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E).
66 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2005).
67 Id. at 180–81.
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indicates that the Navy did not conduct the “hard look”
that NEPA requires.68
The California WaterFix is a proposed project to move the main
point of diversion for the Central Valley Project and State Water Project
to the north delta and to construct two underground tunnels to transport
water from the new diversion point to farms and cities south of the delta.69
Once the new north delta point of diversion and tunnels are operational,
California WaterFix does not include provisions to commit to reduced
Central Valley Project and State Water Project diversions that would
increase instream flow through the Bay Delta.70 Because the California
WaterFix will be undertaken in part by the United States Bureau of
Reclamation that operates the Central Valley Project, a NEPA EIS is
being prepared in connection with the proposed project.71
Fishery conservation groups have criticized the proposed Califor-
nia WaterFix, alleging a failure to evaluate an alternative that commits
to increase flow and reduce diversions to avoid adverse impacts on salmon
and delta smelt.72 For instance, in a joint September 29, 2015 comment
letter to the State Water Resources Control Board on the California
WaterFix, Natural Resources Defense Council, Defenders of Wildlife, Pa-
cific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Association, The Bay Institute,
Golden Gate Salmon Association, and Friends of the Estuary stated:
[T]he existing flow and water quality standards have
proven inadequate to achieve the salmon doubling objec-
tive in the existing water quality control plan, and the [State
Water Resources Control Board] must ensure that the
“appropriate flows” required pursuant to section 85086(b)(2)
[of the California Water Code] will be sufficient to achieve
this objective of the water quality plan. Alternative 4A in
68 Id. at 186–87.
69 Fact Sheet: California WaterFix—Water Right Change Petition and Water Quality Certi-
fication Process (updated July 21, 2016), CAL. WATER BOARDS at 1, https://www.water
boards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/bay_delta/california_waterfix/docs/ca
_waterfix_factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BDL-PQH4] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
70 Id. at 4.
71 Id. at 2.
72 Letter from Nat. Res. Def. Council et al., to Tom Howard, Exec. Dir., State Water Res.
Control Board on Preliminary Comments Regarding the Notice, Fact Sheet and Petition
for Change in Point of Diversion for the California WaterFix (Sept. 29, 2015).
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the California WaterFix fundamentally fails to meet . . .
the salmon doubling objective of the existing Bay-Delta
Water Quality Plan.73
In his August 23, 2016 article, titled Why California WaterFix is
a Path to Extinction for Native Fisheries, Doug Obegi, attorney for the
Natural Resources Defense Council, explained:
[O]nce the tunnels are operational, water temperatures
below Shasta dam will be so high that they will likely be
lethal for endangered winter-run Chinook salmon during
the critical spawning and eff incubation season more than
40 percent of the time in August, 50 percent of September
and more than 90 percent of October, with the most ad-
verse effects happening in drier years.74
. . . .
[I]nstead of helping salmon migrate through the delta, the
[ESA] biological assessment estimates that the tunnels
are likely to reduce survival of juvenile winter-run salmon
as they migrate downstream through the Delta and out to
sea. Salmon are already threatened by low survival rates
as they migrate through the Delta, yet the assessment
shows that survival would worsen with the tunnels.75
. . . .
[N]ew scientific data and analysis from state and federal
agencies shows that more Delta outflow in the spring and
summer is needed to protect the delta smelt. Yet the bio-
logical assessment completely ignores this data and the
effects of reduced flows on delta smelt.76
73 Id.
74 Doug Obegi, Why California WaterFix Is a Path to Extinction for Native Fisheries,
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At this point, with a new Secretary of the Interior in the adminis-
tration of Donald Trump, it remains to be seen whether or not the United
States Bureau of Reclamation will revise the NEPA EIS for the Califor-
nia WaterFix to include an alternative that would reduce diversions and
increase instream flow to maintain fisheries.
E. Federal Power Act § 10—Protecting Fisheries When Dams
Are Relicensed
Under the Federal Power Act, nonfederal dams on navigable rivers
are relicensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.77 Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission relicensing proceedings are now underway
for La Grange Dam in California, which is operated jointly by the Modesto
Irrigation District and the Turlock Irrigation District on the Tuolumne
River—a tributary to the San Joaquin River.78
Section 10(j)(1) of the Federal Power Act requires that a federal
hydropower license “adequately and equitably protect, mitigate damages
to, and enhance fish and wildlife (including related spawning grounds
and habitat) affected by the development, operation, and management of
the project.”79 The National Marine Fisheries Service, United States Fish
and Wildlife Service, or a state fish and wildlife department may recom-
mend such conditions, and if timely submitted, the Federal Power Act
requires that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission must generally
include such conditions in the hydropower license.80
In terms of the La Grange Dam on the Tuolumne River, this
means that if the United States Fish and Wildlife Service or the National
Marine Fisheries Service recommend additional downstream releases
from the dam to protect salmon and smelt below the dam, § 10 of the
Federal Power Act provides that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion must generally include these release conditions in the new license
issued to the operators of La Grange Dam.81
77 16 U.S.C. §§ 803(a), (j).
78 Paul Stanton Kibel, Passage and Flow Considered Anew: Wild Salmon Restoration Via
Hydro Relicensing, 37 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 65, 81–84 (2016) [hereinafter Kibel, Pas-
sage and Flow Considered Anew]. See also NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., Comments of
NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service on the Proposed Study Plan for the La Grange
Hydroelectric Project, P-14581-000 at 1 (Dec. 4, 2014).
79 16 U.S.C. §§ 803 (j)(1).
80 16 U.S.C. §§ 803(a)(3), (j). See also Kibel, Passage and Flow Considered Anew, supra
note 78, at 73.
81 Kibel, Passage and Flow Considered Anew, supra note 78, at 82–84. See also NAT’L
MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 78, at 9–10.
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F. Federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act—Preserving Free-Flowing
Rivers in California
Under the federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, segments of rivers
can be designated as “wild,” “scenic,” or “recreational.”82 Once designated
as “wild” under the federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, a river segment
is protected from activities such as additional diversions or the placement
of new onstream dams that adversely affect its wilderness qualities (in-
cluding maintenance of instream flows to support fisheries).83
Segments of the following rivers in California are designated and
protected as “wild” under the federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act: American
River, Big Sur River, Black Butte River, Eel River, Feather River, Kern
River, Kings River, Klamath River, Merced River, Sespe River, Sisquoc
River, Smith River, Trinity River, and Tuolumne River.84
In terms of the Eel River on California’s north coast, additional
protections under the Wild and Scenic River Act have been proposed for
segments of several creeks that are tributary to the Eel River, including
Gilread Creek, Red Mountain Creek, Eden Creek, Deep Hole Creek,
Indian Creek, and Fish Creek.85 Such designations would limit expanded
diversions of segments on these creeks that are part of the Eel River
watershed that supports one of the most robust salmon and steelhead
trout fisheries in California.86
III. STATE LAW AND STATE AGENCIES AFFECTING INSTREAM WATER
FOR CALIFORNIA FISHERIES
As noted in the introduction to this Article, following the Novem-
ber 2016 federal election, there are indications that the administration
of Donald Trump and the new Congress may seek to reduce the role fed-
eral law and federal agencies play in managing water resources in general,
82 16 U.S.C. § 1271 et seq. (1968). See also An Introduction to Wild and Scenic Rivers,
INTERAGENCY WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS COORDINATING COUNCIL at 3 (1998), https://www
.rivers.gov/documents/wsr-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9PG-SYHY].
83 16 U.S.C. § 1271 et. seq. See also also An Introduction to Wild and Scenic Rivers, supra
note 82, at 3–4.
84 California, NAT’L WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS SYSTEM, https://www.rivers.gov/california
.php [https://perma.cc/TQ95-FRRN] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
85 Upper Eel River Proposed WSRs, CAL. WILDERNESS COALITION, http://www.calwild.org
/portfolio/uppereel-wsrs/ [https://perma.cc/FG6D-9NJJ].
86 16 U.S.C. § 1271 et seq. See also An Introduction to Wild and Scenic Rivers, supra note
82, at 3–4.
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and more specifically the role federal law and federal agencies play in
ensuring instream flow to maintain fisheries.87 Since it appears that fed-
eral law and federal agencies may play a diminished role in this regard
in the near future, California is turning its attention to state laws and
state agencies to ensure there are adequate instream flows in its rivers,
streams, and creeks.88 That is, with the current political ebb and flow
between the respective roles of the federal government and state govern-
ment in water resource governance, California authority is advancing as
federal authority recedes.
There are at least seven sources of California law and legal author-
ity that provide a basis to maintain instream flow for fisheries: Califor-
nia’s Porter Cologne Water Quality Act;89 California public trust law;90
California reasonable use law;91 § 5937 of the California Fish and Game
Code;92 California water quality certification authority;93 California’s
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act;94 and California’s Delta Reform Act.95 These
sources of California law and authority are well-positioned to serve as
the legal foundation for efforts to keep water instream for California
fisheries regardless of what the administration of Donald Trump and the
new Congress may do.
A. California’s Porter-Cologne Water Quality Act—Advancing If
Clean Water Act § 303 Recedes
What if the EPA stops pressing California to update and enforce its
water quality standards for fisheries pursuant to Clean Water Act § 303,
or what if federal legislation is passed limiting application of Clean Water
Act § 303 to the Bay Delta watershed or Central Valley Project operations?
California’s 1969 Porter-Cologne Water Quality Act predates the
federal Clean Water Act and provides California’s Water Board with in-
dependent authority to establish and enforce water quality standards to
protect use of watercourses for fish spawning, rearing, and migration.96
87 Presentations of Zwillinger & Lee, supra note 7.
88 Id.
89 Cal. Water Code §§ 13000 et seq. (Deering 2017).
90 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 452 (1983). See also Kibel, The Public
Trust Navigates California’s Bay Delta, supra note 16, at 36.
91 CAL. CONST. art. XI § 7.; Cal. Water Code § 100.
92 Cal. Fish & Game Code § 5937 (Deering 2017).
93 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
94 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 5093.50 (Deering 2017).
95 Cal. Water Code § 85001 et seq. (Deering 2017).
96 Cal. Water Code § 13000.
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This means that the State Water Resources Control Board has
authority under state law to proceed with its update to the Bay Delta
Water Quality Plan, and the State Water Resources Control Board has
authority under state law to adopt base instream flows for the tributaries
to the San Joaquin River—regardless of whether the EPA exercises its
reviewing authority under § 303 of the Clean Water Act, and regardless
of whether the new Congress and the administration of Donald Trump
may try to limit the application of § 303 of the Clean Water Act.
B. California Public Trust Law—Advancing If Endangered
Species Act § 7 Recedes
What if revised ESA § 7 salmon and delta smelt Biological Opin-
ions are issued by Donald Trump’s administration that reach “no jeop-
ardy” determinations, or what if federal legislation is enacted by the new
Congress that limits application of ESA § 7 to Central Valley Project and
State Water Project operations?
In the landmark 1983 National Audubon case, the California
Supreme Court held that under California law the public trust requires
the State of California to fully protect instream public trust resources
(such as fisheries) whenever feasible.97 In National Audubon, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court clarified:
Once the state has approved an appropriation, the public
trust imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the
taking and use of the appropriated water. In exercising its
sovereign power to allocate water resources in the public
interest, the state is not confined by past allocation deci-
sions which may be incorrect in light of current knowledge
or inconsistent with current needs.98
In the 2014 case of Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water
Resources Control Board, the Sacramento County Superior Court affirmed
that public trust law applies to diversions that harm fisheries in naviga-
ble waters.99 This case involved pumping that reduced instream flow on
97 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 33 Cal. 3d at 452.
98 Id. at 447.
99 Order After Hearing on Cross Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings, Envtl. Law
Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., Case No. 34-2010-80000583, at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct.
July15, 2014).
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the Scott River along California’s north coast.100 In Environmental Law
Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Board, the court stated:
The Scott River located in Siskiyou County is a navigable
waterway used for boating and fishing. In the past two de-
cades the Scott River experienced decreased flows caused
in part by groundwater pumping . . . . As a result of these
decreased flows, the Scott River is often “dewatered” in
the summer and early fall. The river is then reduced to a
series of pools. This, in turn, has injured the river’s fish
populations.101
. . . .
The public trust doctrine would prevent pumping directly
out of the Scott River harming public trust uses. So too
under National Audubon the public trust doctrine would
prevent pumping a non-navigable tributary of the Scott
River harming public trust uses of the river. The court
finds no reason why the analysis of National Audubon
would not apply to the facts alleged here. The court thus
finds the public trust doctrine protects navigable waters
from harm caused by the extraction of groundwater, where
the groundwater is so connected to the navigable water
that its extraction adversely affects public trust uses.102
Therefore, pursuant to state public trust law, regardless of what
happens at the federal level regarding the application of § 7 of the En-
dangered Species Act, California state agencies and California courts
have independent public trust authority to modify existing water rights
to protect salmon and smelt by requiring adequate instream flow for
these fisheries.
C. California Reasonable Use Law—Advancing If Federal Tribal
Fishing Rights Recede
What if the administration of Donald Trump orders the United
States Bureau of Reclamation to discontinue or delay work with the Hoopa
100 Id. at 3.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 8.
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and Yurok Valley Tribes on the salmon plan for the lower Klamath River,
or what if the new President’s administration otherwise decides not to
increase releases from Trinity and Lewiston Dams to give effect to the
Hoopa and Yurok’s tribal fishing rights?
California Constitution Article XI and California Water Code
§ 100 both provide the following:
The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from
any natural stream or water course . . . shall be limited to
such water as shall be reasonably required . . . and such
right does not and shall not extend to the waste or unrea-
sonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreason-
able method of diversion of water.103
In 2014, in its decision in Light v. State Water Resources Control
Board (“Light”) the California Court of Appeal affirmed that the State
Water Resources Control Board may rely on its reasonable use authority
to implement regulatory programs to ensure diversions in the Russian
River watershed do not reduce instream flow so as to imperil salmon.104
In its 2014 decision in Light, the Court rejected plaintiff’s argument that
reasonable use law only allowed for “post-event” judicial enforcement and
did not support “pre-event” preventative administrative regulation, holding:
Restricting the [State Water Resources Control Board] to
post-event litigation deprives it of any effective regulatory
remedy, since the damage will have been done and the
critical circumstances may not arise again for months or
years. It is difficult to imagine what effective relief a court
grant, other than a broad and inflexible injunction against
future diversions . . . a ruling that would be in the interests
neither of the enjoined growers nor the public. Efficient
regulation of the state’s water resources in these circum-
stances demands that the [State Water Resources Control
Board] have the authority to enact tailored regulations.105
In 1986, in what became known as the “Racanelli Decision” (after
Judge Racanelli who authored the opinion), the California Court of Appeals
103 CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; Cal. Water Code § 100.
104 Light v. State Water Res. Control, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1472–73 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
105 Id. at 1486–87.
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affirmed that California’s Water Board could rely on its reasonable use
authority to modify the Central Valley Project and State Water Project
water rights to ensure sufficient freshwater flow to prevent seawater
intrusion.106 The Racanelli Decision held:
[T]he [Water] Board had the authority to modify the pro-
jects’ permits to curtail their use of water on the ground
that the projects’ use and diversion of the water had be-
come unreasonable . . . We perceive no legal obstacle to
the [Water] Board’s determination that particular meth-
ods of use have become unreasonable by their deleterious
effects upon water quality.107
So, in the event the administration of Donald Trump does not seek
to increase releases from Lewiston and Trinity Dams to give effect to the
Hoopa and Yurok Valley Tribes’s fishing rights, the State Water Re-
sources Control Board can rely on its state reasonable use law authority
to compel such releases from Lewiston and Trinity Dams.
D. Section 5937 of California Fish and Game Code—Advancing If
NEPA Alternatives Analysis Recedes
What if the administration of Donald Trump does not require the
United States Bureau of Reclamation to revise the NEPA EIS for the
California WaterFix to evaluate an increased flow alternative, or what
if federal legislation is enacted by the new Congress that exempts the
California WaterFix from NEPA’s requirements?
The administration of Donald Trump has already taken steps that
signal a narrow rather than a broad interpretation of federal agency
environmental impact assessment obligations under NEPA. On August 15,
2017, Donald Trump signed Executive Order 13807, titled Establishing
Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental Review Process for
Infrastructure Projects.108 Among other things, Executive Order 13807
calls upon the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) to identify
actions that will “ensure that agencies apply NEPA in a manner that
reduces unnecessary burdens and delays as much as possible, including
by using CEQ’s authority to interpret NEPA to simplify and accelerate
106 US v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 98 (1986).
107 Id. at 130.
108 Exec. Order No. 13807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,463 (Aug. 15, 2017).
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the NEPA review process.”109 Narrowing the scope of alternatives consid-
ered in NEPA environmental documents might be a way to achieve Ex-
ecutive Order 13807’s objective of simplifying and accelerating the NEPA
review process.
As explained above, the California WaterFix would alter the fed-
eral Central Valley Project, the largest water diversion project in Califor-
nia.110 The federal Central Valley Project operates in a coordinated fashion
with the State Water Project which is operated by the California Depart-
ment of Water Resources.111 For instance, these federal and state water
projects share diversion facilities near the city of Tracy, California that
divert water from the Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta into the two pro-
jects’ water delivery system.112
Section 5937 of the California Fish and Game Code requires that
“[t]he owner of any dam shall allow sufficient water at all times to pass
through a fishway, or in the absence of a fishway, allow sufficient water
to pass over, around or through the dam, to keep in good condition any
fish that may be planted or exist below the dam.”113 In the 2004 case of
NRDC v. Patterson, the federal district court in Sacramento considered
whether § 5937 requirements applied to the United States Bureau of
Reclamation’s operation of Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River, which
is a key piece of water storage infrastructure for the federal Central Valley
Project.114 Writing for the court, Judge Lawrence Karlton explained:
The Bureau built Friant Dam across the upper San Joaquin
River, northwest of Fresno, in the early 1940s as part of
the Central Valley Project. Construction began in 1939
and was largely completed by the mid-1940s115 . . . Friant
Dam blocked upstream access to a portion of the San
Joaquin River’s spawning habitat for salmon and steel-
head; however, it was not the construction of the Dam that
terminated the salmon runs. For several years after Friant
Dam was in place, the Bureau released sufficient water to
sustain the salmon fishery.116
109 Id. at 40,468.
110 See generally Coordinated Long-Term Operations, supra note 40.
111 See generally id.
112 See generally id.
113 Cal. Fish and Game Code § 5937.
114 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Patterson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 906, 913–14 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
115 Id. at 909.
116 Id. at 909–10.
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. . . .
By the late 1940s, however, the Bureau’s operation of Friant
Dam had caused long stretches of the River to dry up (cita-
tion omitted). In the spring of 1948, the California Division
of Fish and Game responded with a dramatic fish rescue in
an attempt to save the River’s spring-run Chinook salmon.
About 2,000 up-migrating Chinook were trapped in the
lower portion of the River, hauled by truck around the de-
watered stretch of the River, and released at a point from
which they would migrate upstream to deep pools just below
Friant Dam. The salmon were able to hold over the summer
in these pools, and to spawn successfully below Friant
Dam in the fall, but their offspring perished in early 1949
when they attempted to out-migrate through the dried-up
River bed.
With the completion of the Friant-Kern Canal, the Bureau
in 1949 further increased diversions, leaving even less
water for the San Joaquin River (citation omitted). The
last of the upper San Joaquin River’s fall-run Chinook
salmon were reported in a pool below Mendota Dam in
1949 (citation omitted). Spring-run Chinook salmon dis-
appeared from the San Joaquin River after unsuccessful
salmon rescue attempts in 1949 and 1950 (citations omit-
ted). For most of the last 50 years, the Bureau has di-
verted virtually all of the River’s flows (citation omitted).
While salmon continue to return and spawn until 1949,
after that, “the San Joaquin chinook was extirpated in its
southernmost range.” (citation omitted).
Some sixty miles of the River upstream of its confluence
with the Merced [River] now lie continuously dry, except
during rare flood events (citation omitted). The spring-run
Chinook—once the most abundant race of salmon in the
Central Valley—appear to have been extirpated from the
length of the River (citation omitted).117
117 Id. at 910.
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In his decision, Judge Karlton also noted how the lack of releases
from Friant Dam was also adversely affecting salmon in the lower portions
of the San Joaquin River (below the confluence with the Merced River)
by reducing the instream flows needed to maintain water temperatures
at which cold-water fish such as salmon can survive, observing that “[r]e-
duced flows in the San Joaquin River below Friant Dam have . . . increased
the temperature of the water that is available.”118
Judge Karlton continued:
In California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), the Su-
preme Court explained that the “cooperative federalism”
mandated by § 8 [of the federal Reclamation Act] required
the United States to comply with state water laws unless
that law was directly inconsistent with clear congressional
directives regarding the project. Id. at 650 (“The history of
the relationship between the Federal Government and the
States in the reclamation of arid lands of the Western
States is both long and involved, but through it run the
consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to
state water law by Congress.”).119
In NRDC v. Patterson, Judge Karlton then went on conclude that
the United States Bureau of Reclamation’s operation of Friant Dam vio-
lated § 5937 of the California Fish and Game Code:
There is no genuine dispute, however, as to whether the
Bureau has released sufficient water to maintain historic
fisheries, and the record, in any event, is clear that the
Bureau has not.120
. . . .
The Bureau, by its own admission, releases no water for
this purpose and long stretches of the River downstream
are dry most of the time.121
118 Id. at 911.
119 Id. at 914.
120 Nat. Res. Def. Council, 333 F. Supp. at 924.
121 Id. at 925.
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. . . .
Historically, the upper San Joaquin River supported a
large spring-run of chinook salmon. The annual spawning
run of these fish numbered in the tens of thousands as
late as the mid-1940s.122
. . . .
The extinction of these San Joaquin stocks can be directly
attributed to inadequate instream flows, specifically, those
which enable adult salmon to migrate upstream . . . . The
[Friant Dam] project diverted nearly the entire river and
a long reach of the waterway had been dried up.123
Therefore, in the event that the United States Bureau of Reclama-
tion does not consider an increased flow alternative as part of its evalua-
tion of the California WaterFix—either because the administration of
Donald Trump does not require the agency to consider the increased flow
alternative or because the new Congress exempts the California WaterFix
from NEPA—§ 5937 may provide the State Water Resources Control Board
with authority to require, for example, additional releases from Shasta
Dam to help maintain water temperatures below the dam at 60 degrees
Fahrenheit or lower to protect salmon and steelhead trout cold-water
fisheries.124 Reliance on § 5937 in this instance would presumably be
premised on evidence establishing that releases from Shasta Dam to pre-
vent water temperatures from rising above 60 degrees Fahrenheit are
consistent with the United States Bureau of Reclamation’s obligation to
release sufficient water to maintain salmon and steelhead trout fisheries
below Shasta Dam in “good condition.”
E. California Water Quality Certification Authority—Advancing If
Federal Power Act § 10 Recedes
What if under the administration of Donald Trump, the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service do
not propose dam licensing terms to the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission to ensure additional downstream releases for California fisheries?
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Cal. Fish & Game Code § 5937.
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Clean Water Act § 401 provides that states are responsible for
certifying that projects approved by federal agencies (such as the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission) do not violate state water quality stan-
dards.125 For example, pursuant to Clean Water Act § 401, water quality
certification by the State Water Resources Control Board is required for
federal relicensing of La Grange Dam on the Tuolumne River (tributary
to the San Joaquin River).126
In its 1994 decision in the case of City of Tacoma v. Washington
Department of Ecology, the United States Supreme Court held—in a deci-
sion authored by Justice O’Connor and joined by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist—that state water quality certification may include relicensing
terms to maintain instream flow for fisheries.127 In this case, pursuant
to its water quality certification authority, the State of Washington imposed
instream flow conditions to protect salmon on a municipal dam being re-
licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.128 In her opinion
in Washington Department of Ecology, Justice O’Connor wrote:
Petitioners also assert more generally that the Clean Water
Act is only concerned with water “quality” and does not al-
low the regulation of water “quantity.” This is an artificial
distinction. In many cases, water quantity is closely re-
lated to water quality; a sufficient lowering of the water
quantity in a body of water could destroy all of its desig-
nated uses, be it for drinking water, recreation, navigation
or, as here, as a fishery.129
Under the administration of Donald Trump, it is foreseeable that
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine
Fisheries Service may not use their authority under § 10 of the Federal
Power Act to require the inclusion of downstream releases for fish in
federal hydropower licenses, such as the license now being considered for
La Grange Dam on the Tuolumne River in California.130
125 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
126 Kibel, Passage and Flow Considered Anew, supra note 78, at 76–77, 81–84. See generally
NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 78.
127 Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 723 (1994).
128 Id. at 709.
129 Id. at 719.
130 Kibel, Passage and Flow Considered Anew, supra note 78, at 81–84. See generally
NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 78.
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Under this scenario, however, the State Water Resources Control
Board can still rely on its state water quality certification authority to
require the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to include fishery
conservation measures related to instream flow when relicensing non-
federal dams in California such as La Grange Dam.131
F. California Wild and Scenic River Protections—Advancing If
Federal Wild and Scenic River Protections Recede
What if the administration of Donald Trump or the new Congress
weaken the protections afforded river segments (such as those on the Eel
River) designated as “wild” under the federal Wild and Scenic River Act,
or what if the administration of Donald Trump or the new Congress reject
pending proposals to extend “wild” designations to segments of several
creeks that are tributary to the Eel River?
In addition to the federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, the State of
California has enacted the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, signed
into law by Republican Governor Ronald Reagan in 1971.132
Similar to the federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, once a river is
designated as “wild” under the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, a
river segment is protected from activities such as additional diversions
or the placement of new onstream dams that adversely affect its wilder-
ness qualities (including maintenance of instream flows to support fisher-
ies).133 Several segments of the Eel River in California are designated and
protected as wild pursuant to the California Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act,134 and additional segments in the Eel River watershed are now being
considered for “wild” designations under the California Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act.135
131 Id.
132 Cal. Pub. Res. Code, §§ 5093.50–.70 (Deering 2017). See also Robert Crabbe, ‘Wild, Scenic’
Status for Rivers Sought, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 10, 1985), http://articles.latimes.com/1985-11
-10/news/mn-3362_1_wild-river [https://perma.cc/WA3Q-55US].
133 Cal. Pub. Res. Code, §§ 5093.50–.70.
134 Wild and Scenic Rivers and Management Agencies, CAL. DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION
(June 2007) at 1–2, available at http://www.dot.ca.gov/ser/vol1/sec3/special/ch19wsrivers
/wild_and_scenic_designation_and_agencies.doc [https://perma.cc/GH6R-SMMY].
135 Upper Eel River & Tributaries: Proposed Wild & Scenic Rivers, CAL. WILDERNESS COALI-
TION, https://www.calwild.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Upper-Eel-Basin-Rivers-Cal
Wild-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FUK-JYE9] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
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Therefore, regardless of whether the administration of Donald
Trump or the new Congress take actions to reduce or limit wild designa-
tions of Eel River watershed segments under the federal Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act, the State of California can maintain and pursue such wild
designations under the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.
G. Instream Flow Requirements Under California’s Delta Reform
Act—Advancing If Federal Instream Flow Requirements Recede
As discussed above in Part II of this Article, there are several
sources of federal law and federal authority that have traditionally been
used to help maintain adequate instream flows for fisheries in California.
These sources of federal law and federal authority include § 303 of the
Clean Water Act,136 § 7 of the Endangered Species Act,137 and § 10 of the
Federal Power Act.138 As also noted above, the federal Central Valley Proj-
ect and California’s State Water Project are operated in a coordinated
fashion and share certain critical infrastructure.139
What if, under the administration of Donald Trump and the new
Congress, there are statutory changes to the Clean Water Act, Endan-
gered Species Act, or Federal Power Act, or changes in federal policies
implementing these laws, that reduce the role that these federal laws
play maintaining instream flows into and through the Sacramento–San
Joaquin Delta?
In 2009, the California Legislature declared, “The Sacramento–
San Joaquin Delta watershed and California’s water infrastructure are
in crisis and existing policies are not sustainable. Resolving the crisis
requires fundamental reorganization of the state’s management of Delta
watershed resources.”140 Accordingly, the California Legislature enacted
the Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009 (“Delta Reform
Act”) and created a new state agency, the Delta Stewardship Council.141
Pursuant to the Delta Reform Act, the Delta Stewardship Council was
directed to prepare and adopt a “legally enforceable Delta Plan” that
must further the “co-equal” goals of (1) providing a more reliable water
136 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000).
137 Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 7, 87 Stat. 884, 892 (1973).
138 16 U.S.C. §§ 803(a), (j) (1992).
139 See generally Coordinated Long-Term Operations, supra note 40.
140 Cal. Water Code § 85001(a) (Deering 2017).
141 Id. § 85001.
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supply for California and (2) protecting, restoring, and enhancing the
Delta ecosystem.142
In 2013, the Delta Stewardship Council approved its Delta Plan.
Several lawsuits were then filed against the Delta Stewardship Council
by commercial fishing, recreational fishing, and conservation groups al-
leging that the approved Delta Plan did not comply with the require-
ments of the Delta Reform Act in several critical aspects, including the
alleged absence of plan elements to provide adequate instream flows to
support fisheries.143 On May 18, 2016, Sacramento County Superior Court
Judge Michael P. Kinney issued his ruling in these cases, finding that
the Delta Reform Act required that the Delta Plan include detailed and
enforceable provisions to ensure adequate instream flows in the Sacra-
mento–San Joaquin Delta and that the Delta Plan initially approved
failed to do so. In his 2016 opinion, Judge Kinney held:
Section 85301, subdivision (e)(4) [of the Delta Reform Act]
provides “[t]he following subgoals and strategies for re-
storing a healthy ecosystem shall be included in the Delta
Plan . . . (4) Restore Delta flows and channels to support
a health estuary and other ecosystems.” Petitioners argue
that the Delta Plan only sets a vague goal of “[p]rogress
toward restoring in-Delta flows to more natural functional
flow patterns to support a healthy estuary . . .” (citation
omitted). Petitioners maintain this goal is not a “quanti-
fied or other measurable target” for any kind of “natural
functional flow patterns” and fails to identify any criteria
for measurement.144
. . . .
Respondent argues the goal of ER P1 provides a generalized
measurement, and that the [Delta Stewardship] Council
“intends to refine its performance measures.” (citation omit-
ted). Again, “progress” is not defined. It does not provide a
quantified or otherwise measurable target upon which the
Delta Plan can be gauged. While Respondent may intend
142 Id. § 85059.
143 Id. § 85054.
144 Ruling on Submitted Matter: Petitions for Writ of Mandate, Bifurcated Proceedings
on Statutory Challenges, Delta Stewardship Council Cases, Judicial Council Coordina-
tion Proceeding No. 4758, at 14 (Super. Ct. of Cal., May 18, 2016).
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to refine its performance measurements, the Delta Reform
Act requires such measurable targets to be included in the
Delta Plan. As Respondent has certified that it has com-
pleted the Delta Plan, any future modifications are not
relevant to a determination of whether the Delta Plan
currently complies with the Delta Reform Act.
The Court finds that the Delta Plan fails to “include quan-
tified or otherwise measurable targets associated with”
restoring more natural flows as required by the Delta
Reform Act.145
Pursuant to Judge Kinney’s 2016 ruling on California’s Delta
Reform Act, the Delta Plan prepared by the Delta Stewardship Council
must include quantified measurable targets for instream flows to support
a healthy estuary and ecosystem in the Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta
regardless of whether such quantified measurable targets for instream
flows are imposed pursuant to § 303 of the Clean Water Act, § 7 of the
Endangered Species Act, or § 10 of the Federal Power Act.
IV. PREEMPTION COMETH? H.R. 23 AND STATE SELF-GOVERNANCE
As discussed above, there is an extensive body of California water
law that is well situated to maintain instream flows for fisheries if fed-
eral law and federal agencies play a reduced role in this area. This
scenario, however, raises the question as to whether the administration
of Donald Trump and the new Congress will take steps to try to preempt
California water law or limit the applicability of California water law
that might otherwise be relied upon to maintain such instream flows.
At the outset, it should be noted that efforts by the administration
of Donald Trump and the new Congress to limit the ability of a state to
regulate water resources would be at odds with the previous positions of
Scott Pruitt, President Trump’s Secretary of the EPA and the former
Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma.146 In his capacity as Okla-
homa’s Attorney General, Pruitt advocated for an expansive view of rights
145 Id. at 15.
146 Chris Mooney et al., Trump names Scott Pruitt Oklahoma attorney general suing EPA
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reserved to the states and a limited view of the authority of the federal
government to displace such state authority.147
More specifically, in July 2015, in his capacity as Oklahoma’s
Attorney General, Scott Pruitt filed a complaint in federal district court
against the EPA on behalf of the State of Oklahoma.148 In the Complaint
in State of Oklahoma v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,
which was filed under Scott Pruitt’s signature, the State of Oklahoma
challenged the constitutionality of the federal government’s regulation
of coal-fired power plants (part of the EPA Power Plan) under the federal
Clean Air Act.149
In paragraph 12 of the Complaint in State of Oklahoma v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, former Oklahoma Attorney
General Pruitt alleged:
The Clean Air Act is founded on the principle of coopera-
tive federalism, with states retaining the primary author-
ity to regulate emissions from sources in their territories.
The Act specifically recognizes that “air pollution control
at its source is the primary responsibility of States and
local governments.” (citation omitted).150
In paragraph 45 of the Complaint in State of Oklahoma v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, former Oklahoma Attorney
General Pruitt alleged:
EPA lacks the authority to undertake regulation of state
power systems, transmission, and utilities, even though
carrying out its Power Plan will require the exercise of such
regulatory authority. Accordingly, the EPA Power Plan
will require states to exercise such regulatory authority,
whether or not they submit state plans.151
In paragraph 55 of the Complaint in State of Oklahoma v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, former Oklahoma Attorney
General Pruitt alleged: “Whether the State of Oklahoma adopts a state
147 Complaint at ¶ 1, Oklahoma v. EPA, No. 15-CV-369-CVE-FHM (N.D. Okla. July 1, 2015)
[hereinafter Oklahoma v. EPA Complaint].
148 Id. ¶ 3.
149 Id. ¶¶ 1–3, 5.
150 Id. ¶ 12.
151 Id. ¶ 45.
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plan to meet EPA’s goals or EPA promulgates a federal implementation
plan, the EPA Power Plan forces the State of Oklahoma to undertake
substantial legislative, regulatory, planning, and other activities.”152
In paragraph 71 of the Complaint in State of Oklahoma v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, former Oklahoma Attorney Gen-
eral Pruitt alleged: “[T]he EPA Power Plan unlawfully commandeers the
states, in excess of Congress’s Article I authority and in violation of the
Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”153
In paragraph 72 of the Complaint in State of Oklahoma v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, former Oklahoma Attorney
General Pruitt alleged: “[T]he EPA Power Plan unlawfully coerces the
states, in excess of Congress’ Article I authority and in violation of the
Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution . . . [by] severely impair[ing]
states’ exercise of their police powers if they do not comply with EPA’s
demands.”154
As discussed below, the positions advanced by former Oklahoma
Attorney General Pruitt in the State of Oklahoma v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency litigation cannot be easily reconciled
with the expansive approach to federal environmental regulation re-
flected in H.R. 23.
A. H.R. 23’s Attempt to Displace California Water Law
In January 2017, H.R. 23, otherwise known as the “Gaining Re-
sponsibility on Water Act of 2017,” was introduced in the United States
House of Representatives.155 A complete review and analysis of H.R. 23
is beyond the scope of this Article. However, there are provisions in H.R.
23 which purport to displace California water law that may otherwise
provide a basis to keep water instream for fisheries, and purport to direct
how the California Department of Water Resources, the California State
Water Resource Control Board, and the California Department of Fish
and Wildlife shall operate the State Water Project.156 As discussed below,
if H.R. 23 is enacted, and these provisions survive legal challenge, such
provisions may curtail the ability of California agencies to rely on sources
of California water law to keep water instream for fisheries.
152 Id. ¶ 55.
153 Oklahoma v. EPA Complaint, supra note 147, at ¶ 71.
154 Id. ¶ 72.
155 H.R. 23, 115th Cong. (2017).
156 Id. § 108(a)–(b).
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In considering the provisions in H.R. 23, it is again important to
note the ways that the operation of the federal Central Valley Project
(operated by the United States Bureau of Reclamation) and the State
Water Project (operated by the California Department of Water Resources)
are intertwined.157 Both projects operate in the Sacramento River water-
shed and San Joaquin River watershed, both projects affect the timing and
volume of instream flows into the Bay Delta, and the two projects share
and jointly operate water diversion structures in the South delta.158
Section 108(a) of H.R. 23 is titled “Bay-Delta Accord/Congressional
Direction Regarding Central Valley Project and California State Water
Project Operations” and provides in pertinent part:
The Central Valley Project and the State Water Project
shall be operated pursuant to the water quality standards
and operational constraints described in the “Principles
for Agreement on the Bay-Delta Standards Between the
State of California and the Federal Government” dated
December 15, 1994, and such operations shall proceed with-
out regard to the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C.
1531 et seq.) or any other law pertaining to the operation
of the Central Valley Project and the California State
Water Project. Implementation of this section shall be in
strict conformance with the “Principles for Agreement on
the Bay-Delta Standards Between the State of California
and the Federal Government” dated December 15, 1994.159
Significantly, the “any other law” language in Section 108(a) of
H.R. 23 is not limited to federal law, so it presumably could also apply to
the California sources of water law (e.g., California public trust law, Cali-
fornia reasonable use law, § 5937 of the California Fish and Game Code,
the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, and California’s Delta Reform
Act) discussed in this Article.
Additionally, in regard to the application of federal laws to the
operations of the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project,
Section 108(a) of H.R. 23 could limit such application in at least two
respects. First, Section 108(a) of H.R. 23 expressly provides that the
operation of these two water projects “shall proceed without regard to the
157 See generally Coordinated Long-Term Operations, supra note 40.
158 See generally id.
159 H.R. 23 § 108(a).
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Endangered Species Act” suggesting that such operations would poten-
tially be exempt from compliance with § 7 of the federal Endangered
Species Act and the salmon and delta smelt Biological Opinions (dis-
cussed above) issued pursuant to this provision.160
Second, Section 108(a)’s provision that the operation of these two
water projects “shall proceed without regard to . . . any other law” could
potentially displace or limit the application of several federal laws that
currently preserve a substantive role for the State of California in activi-
ties affecting the Sacramento River–San Joaquin River watersheds where
the Central Valley Project and State Water Project operate.161 Such federal
laws include: § 401 of the federal Clean Water Act (discussed above), which
allows the State of California to impose instream flow conditions on
federal projects in California that impact water quality;162 § 10 of the
Federal Power Act (discussed above) which generally requires that the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission include fishery protection mea-
sures proposed by the State of California Department of Fish and Wild-
life in federal hydropower licenses for nonfederal dams in California;163
and § 8 of the Federal Reclamation Act (discussed above) which requires
that dams in California operated by the United States Bureau of Recla-
mation comply with California water laws.164 All of these provisions of
federal law, which currently help guide how the Central Valley Project
and State Water Project operate and how instream flows and fisheries
throughout California are managed, could potentially be altered by
§ 108(a) of H.R. 23.
Section 108(b) of H.R. 23 is titled “Bay-Delta Accord/Application
of Laws to Others” and provides in pertinent part:
Neither a Federal department nor the State of California,
including any agency or board of the State of California,
shall impose on any water right obtained pursuant to
State law, including a pre-1914 appropriative right, any
condition that restricts the exercise of that water right in
order to conserve, enhance, recover or otherwise protect
any species that is affected by the operations of the Cen-
tral Valley Project or California State Water Project. Nor
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2001).
163 16 U.S.C. §§ 803(a), (j) (1992).
164 California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674–79 (1978).
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shall the State of California, including any agency or board
of the State of California, restrict the exercise of any water
right obtained pursuant to State law, including a pre-1914
appropriative right, in order to protect, enhance, or restore
under the Public Trust Doctrine any public trust value.165
Significantly, the “any species that is affected by the Central Valley
Project or California State Water Project” language in Section 108(b) of
H.R. 23 could potentially be interpreted broadly to apply to fisheries that
are not themselves affected by the Central Valley Project and the State
Water Project. For instance, there are salmon and steelhead trout runs
in many California coastal rivers and watersheds that are not affected
directly by the operations of the Central Valley Project and the State
Water Project.166 However, because salmon and steelhead trout are species
affected by the operations of the Central Valley Project and the State
Water Project, Section 108(b) of H.R. 23 could be interpreted to apply to
salmon and steelhead trout located in coastal rivers and watersheds unaf-
fected by the federal and state water projects. If interpreted in this way,
Section 108(b) could potentially displace California water law protections
(including but not limited to protections under California public trust
law) for salmon and steelhead trout fisheries throughout the state.
Predictably, H.R. 23 has provoked a powerful response from Cali-
fornia’s commercial fishermen, who view the proposed legislation as a
direct threat to their economic livelihood. John McManus, Executive
Director of the Golden Gate Salmon Association, put these concerns
bluntly: “In this bill, they’re just saying, ‘Let’s turn the rivers into canals
and forget about keeping fish alive . . . .’ ”167
In response to H.R. 23, on July 11, 2017 the Attorney General of
California, Xavier Becerra, sent a letter to Speaker Paul Ryan of the United
States House of Representatives.168 In this letter, California Attorney
General Becerra asserted that H.R. 23 would “transgress state sover-
eignty,”169 explaining:
165 H.R. 23, § 108(b).
166 See id.
167 Alastair Bland, House Bill Redirects River Flows From Fish to Farms, WATER DEEPLY
(Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.newsdeeply.com/water/articles/2017/08/02/house-bill-redi
rects-river-flows-from-fish-to-farms [https://perma.cc/RW8W-RWBP].
168 Letter from Xavier Becerra, supra note 12.
169 Id. at 1.
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First, the legislation would mandate that the federal Cen-
tral Valley Project (CVP) and the California State Water
Project (SWP), the largest water projects in the State,
operate to outdated water quality standards for the Sac-
ramento–San Joaquin Delta developed over twenty-two
years ago, and would preclude state authorities from alter-
ing such standards notwithstanding the cumulative scien-
tific evidence that these standards are insufficient to
protect the State’s fisheries. Second, the legislation would
prohibit the California State Water Resources Control
Board (SWRCB) and the California Department of Fish
and Wildlife (DFW) from exercising their state law duties
to protect fishery resources and public trust values, not
only as to CVP and SWP operations, but as to all water
right holders in California . . . the legislation would over-
turn settled principles of cooperative federalism . . . .170
. . . .
These proposed constraints on California’s ability to man-
age its natural resources conflict with historic principles
of western water law. In California v. United States (1978)
438 U.S. 645, 654, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Cali-
fornia’s ability to impose state law terms and conditions
on federal reclamation projects, and declared that, “[t]he
history of the relationship between the Federal government
and the States in the reclamation of the arid lands of the
Western States is both long and involved, but through it
runs the consistent thread of purposeful and continued
deference to state water law by Congress.”171
California law grants the SWRCB the continuing author-
ity to review and reconsider all water rights for the pur-
pose of determining whether their exercise would violate
the reasonable use requirement of the Article X, Section 2
of the California constitution and California’s common law
doctrine of the public trust. According to the California
170 Id. at 1–2.
171 Id. at 2.
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Supreme Court, “[t]he state has an affirmative duty to take
the public trust into account in the planning and alloca-
tion of water resources, and to protect public trust uses
whenever feasible.” (National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 319, 446.). The California Legisla-
ture has adopted these principles as the “foundation of state
water management policy.” (Cal. Wat. Code, § 85023.) H.R.
23 would abrogate California’s ability to apply its water
resource laws . . . .172
In his July 11, 2017 letter, California Attorney General Becerra continues:
In addition, H.R. 23 takes these steps in violation of set-
tled constitutional principles of state sovereignty. Relying
upon separation of powers principles set forth in the Tenth
Amendment and elsewhere in the U.S. Constitution, the
U.S. Supreme Court in New York v. United States has held
that “even where Congress has the authority under the Con-
stitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts,
it lacks the power to directly compel the States to require or
prohibit those acts.” (New York v. United States (1992) 505
U.S. 144, 166–167.) In Printz v. United States, the U.S.
Supreme Court expanded its ruling in New York and held
that “[t]oday we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that
prohibition by conscripting the States’ officers directly.”
(Printz v. United States (1997) 521 U.S. 898, 935.)
By compelling the SWP, a state-funded and managed water
project, to operate based on congressionally-mandated Delta
water quality standards, rather than allowing California
to develop standards that reflect the most recent scientific
information regarding the Delta, H.R. 23 is “requiring” a
state agency to comply with a federal policy. By prevent-
ing the SWRCB, the DFW, and other state agencies from
taking actions to protect fishery and other public trust
values, H.R. 23 is “prohibiting” the State from enforcing
state law. These provisions of H.R. 23 violate settled state
sovereignty principles. Congressional passage of H.R. 23
would have, in effect, unconstitutionally “dragooned” state
172 Id.
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agencies and state officials “into administering federal law.”
(Printz, supra, 521 U.S. at 928.)173
It remains to be seen whether H.R. 23 will be passed by Congress
and signed into law by President Donald Trump. Should H.R. 23 be en-
acted, the expectation is that it will be aggressively challenged in court
by the State of California.174 In fact, anticipating the potential for such
a challenge, the State of California has retained Eric Holder (former
Attorney General of the United States) to advise and represent the state
in connection with potential efforts by the administration of Donald
Trump and the new Congress to preempt, displace or otherwise limit the
applicability and enforceability of California law.175
Somewhat ironically, and as noted above, the legal grounds the
State of California and former Attorney General Eric Holder may rely
upon in such a legal challenge could be based on the federalism and
reserved states’s rights positions previously advocated for by Scott Pruitt,
the current Secretary of the EPA in the administration of Donald Trump
who previously served as Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma.176
In particular, California Attorney General Becerra’s position regarding
H.R. 23’s unconstitutional commandeering of state agencies by the fed-
eral government177 aligns closely with former Oklahoma Attorney Gen-
eral Pruitt’s unconstitutional commandeering position in the July 2015
Complaint filed in State of Oklahoma v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency.178
B. State Self-Governance
In connection with the commandeering argument advanced against
H.R. 23 in California Attorney General Becerra’s July 11, 2017 letter, and
in connection with the commandeering argument advanced by former
Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt in his July 2015 Complaint in
173 Id. at 2–3.
174 Presentations of Zwillinger & Lee, supra note 7.
175 Adam Nagourney, California Hires Eric Holder as Legal Bulwark Against Donald Trump,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/us/california-eric-holder
-donald-trump.html [https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04
/us/california-eric-holder-donald-trump.html].
176 See Oklahoma v. EPA Complaint, supra note 147, at ¶ 1.
177 Letter from Xavier Becerra, supra note 12, at 3.
178 Oklahoma v. EPA Complaint, supra note 147, at ¶ 71.
514 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 42:477
State of Oklahoma v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, on
July 27, 2017 the California Supreme Court issued a decision in Friends
of the Eel River v. North Coast Railroad Authority that may also bear on
this legal question.179
The Friends of the Eel River case did not involve water law or
fisheries, but rather involved the relationship between the federal Inter-
state Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”) and the Califor-
nia Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).180 The North Coast Railroad
Authority (“NCRA”), a California state agency created in 1989, proposed
to rehabilitate a dilapidated and dormant railroad line that ran along the
banks of the Eel River in Northern California and to enter into a contract
with a private company, Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company, to oper-
ate the rehabilitated state-owned railroad line.181
CEQA requires that state and local agencies in California, such
as the NRCA, undertake an environmental impact assessment before
approving agency projects that may have significant adverse effects on
the environment.182 Pursuant to CEQA, NRCA prepared an environmen-
tal impact report (“EIR”) in connection with the rehabilitation and re-
newed operation of the railroad line along the Eel River, and several
nonprofit organizations (including Friends of the Eel River) sued NRCA
on the grounds that EIS did not comply with CEQA’s requirements.183
NRCA and the Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company responded to this
CEQA claim by alleging that the federal ICCTA pre-empted CEQA’s
application to the railroad line’s rehabilitation and renewed operation.184
In considering this question in its decision in Friends of the Eel
River, the California Supreme Court noted:
True, the ICCTA contemplated a uniform national system
of railroad lines subject to federal, and not state, regula-
tion . . . [I]n this case we must explore the application of
the ICCTA preemption clause to the state’s decisions with
respects to it is own subsidiary government entity in con-
nection with a railroad project owned by the state.
179 Friends of the Eel River v. N. Coast R.R. Auth., 399 P.3d 37, 52 (Cal. 2017).
180 Id. at 43.
181 Id. at 45.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 43.
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When a project is owned by the state, the question arises
whether an act of self-governance on the part of the state
actually constitutes regulation at all within the terms of
the ICCTA. Even though the ICCTA applies to state-owned
rail lines, in the sense that states as owners cannot violate
provisions of the ICCTA or invade the regulatory province
of the federal regulatory agency, this is not the end of the
question. In our view, the application of state law to gov-
ern the functioning of subdivisions of the state does not
necessarily constitute regulation. To determine the reach
of the federal law preempting state regulation of a state-
owned railroad we must consider a presumption that, in
the absence of unmistakably clear language, Congress does
not intend to deprive the state of sovereignty over its own
subdivisions to the point of upsetting the usual constitu-
tional balance of state and federal powers.185
In its decision in Friends of the Eel River, California Supreme
Court elaborated:
To understand whether application of CEQA to the rail
carriers in this case would constitute regulation of rail
transportation within the terms of the ICCTA, we must
review some essential features of CEQA.
CEQA embodies a central state policy to require state and
local government entities to perform their duties “so that
major consideration is given to preventing environmental
damage.” (citation omitted).
CEQA prescribes how governmental decisions will be made
when public entities, including the state itself, are charged
with approving, funding—or themselves undertaking—a
project with significant effects on the environment. (cita-
tion omitted).
The Legislature, in enacting CEQA, imposed certain prin-
ciples of self-government on public entities. In other words,
185 Friends of the Eel River, 399 P.3d at 43.
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CEQA is a legislatively imposed directive governing how
state and local agencies will go about exercising the gov-
ernmental discretion that is vested in them over land use
decisions. (citations omitted).186
The California Supreme Court then went on to hold that the ICCTA
does not preempt CEQA’s application to the NCRA’s rehabilitation and
renewed operation of the railroad line along the Eel River, explaining:
CEQA embodies a state policy adopted by the Legislature
to govern how the state itself and the state’s own subdivi-
sions will exercise their responsibility. When CEQA condi-
tions the issuance of a permit for private development on
CEQA compliance, and thereby restricts the ability of the
private citizens and companies to develop their property,
this seems plainly regulatory. But CEQA also operates as
a form of self-government when the state or a subdivision
of the state is itself the owner of the property and proposes
to develop it. Application of CEQA to the public entity
charged with developing state property is not classic regu-
latory behavior . . . Rather, application of CEQA in this
context constitutes self-governance on the part of a sover-
eign state and at the same time on the part of an owner.
It appears to us extremely unlikely that Congress, in en-
acting the ICCTA, intended to preempt a state’s adoption
and use of the tools of self-governance in this situation, or
to leave the state, as owner, without any means of estab-
lishing the basic principles under which it will undertake
significant capital expenditures.187
The self-government/self-governance holding in the California
Supreme Court’s decision in Friends of the Eel River is pertinent to an
evaluation of H.R. 23 preemption issues in two respects.
First, Sections 108(a) and 108(b) of H.R. 23 propose to prohibit the
California Department of Water Resources from operating California’s
State Water Project in accordance with California water law, such as
California public trust law, California reasonable use law, § 5937 of the
186 Id. at 57–58.
187 Id. at 65.
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California Fish and Game Code, the California Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act, and California’s Delta Reform Act.188 Much like the way the California
Supreme Court found that CEQA operated as a form of self-government
for the NCRA’s ownership and operation of a state owned railroad line,
so these sources of California water law operate as a form of self-govern-
ment for the California Department of Water Resources’s ownership and
operation of the State Water Project. In this respect, allowing H.R. 23 to
displace the application of California water law to the State of California’s
operation of the State Water Project would intrude on the same state
sovereignty concerns that led the California Supreme Court to find that
the federal ICCTA did not displace the application of CEQA to the State
of California’s operation of the state-owned railroad along the Eel River.189
Second, under California law, surface waters in the state are not
owned by the parties that divert, store, or use such waters.190 Rather, the
surface waters are the property of the State of California, who then pro-
vides parties with conditional permission to divert, store, and use such
surface waters through appropriative water right permits issued by the
California State Water Resources Control Board Division of Water Rights
in accordance with California water law.191 As California water lawyer
Gary Sawyers explains in his guide A Primer on California Water Rights:
[N]o water user in the State “owns” any water. Instead, a
water right grants the holder thereof only the right to use
water (called a “usufructuary right”). The owner of “legal
title” to all water is the State in its capacity as trustee for
the benefit of the public.192
For example, the United States Bureau of Reclamation does not own
the surface water that it stores, diverts, and distributes as part of the fed-
eral Central Valley Project. Rather, the United States Bureau of Reclama-
tion applied to the California State Water Resources Control Board for
appropriative water right permits for the diversion and storage opera-
tions associated with the Central Valley Project.193 But for the issuance
188 H.R. 23 § 108(a)–(b).
189 Friends of the Eel River, 399 P.3d at 66.




193 California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 654.
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of the appropriative water right permits by the State Water Resources
Control Board, the United States Bureau of Reclamation would have no
entitlement to store, divert, or distribute surface waters as part of the
federal Central Valley Project.194
H.R. 23 attempts to prohibit the State Water Resources Control
Board from ensuring that the United States Bureau of Reclamation’s
exercise of its appropriative surface water permits for the Central Valley
Project complies with California water law.195 Yet the surface waters in
question are not owned by the United States Bureau of Reclamation, they
are owned by the State of California which has adopted a comprehensive
body of state water law to govern the terms and conditions under which
such state-owned surface waters may be used.196
In Friends of the Eel River, the California Supreme Court held
that when a state is managing property that the state itself owns pursu-
ant to state law, this is not regulation at all but rather constitutes “self-
governance.”197 H.R. 23’s proposal to prevent the State of California from
complying with state water law in determining the usage of surface
waters does not take account of the fact that such surface waters are
owned by the State of California.198
C. A Broader Legal Scholarship and Policy Context: Floors,
Ceilings, and New Progressive Federalism
As suggested in the July 2017 letter from California Attorney Gen-
eral Xavier Beccera on H.R. 23,199 and the recent opinion of the California
Supreme Court in Friends of the Eel River,200 the prospect of increased
reliance on California law to keep water instream for fisheries raises fed-
eralism concerns that arise in a broader context, both in terms of legal
scholarship and public policy. Although a comprehensive discussion of this
broader context is beyond the scope of this Article, there are two points that
may help to better situate the Article’s preceding analysis and discussion.
First, going back several decades, there is a body of federalism and
environmental law scholarship that focuses on the distinction between
federal laws that create “floors” but allow state law standards with more
194 Id.
195 H.R. 23 § 108(a)–(b).
196 Sawyers, supra note 190, at 1, 10.
197 Friends of the Eel River, 399 P.3d at 37, 43–44.
198 H.R. 23 § 108(a)–(b).
199 Letter from Xavier Becerra, supra note 12, at 2–3.
200 Friends of the Eel River, 399 P.3d at 53.
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stringent standards for environmental and natural resource protection,
and federal laws that create “ceilings” which prohibit state law from
adopting standards for environmental and natural resource protection
that are more stringent than federal standards.201 There is an aspect of
federal preemption for both federal floors and federal ceilings, but this
preemption works quite differently depending on whether a floor or a
ceiling is involved. As Georgetown Law School Professor William Buzbee
explained in his 2007 article titled Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Pre-
emption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction:
Typically the debate focused on the federal standard setting
where federal law allows states to increase the stringency
of regulation, but prohibits states from more lenient regu-
lation.202
. . . .
Elimination of state and local authority to regulate risks
may have been a rarity, but several recent legislative and
regulatory actions purport or propose to impose a federal
“ceiling,” where the federal action would displace any ad-
ditional potential by other actors, be they states or some-
times even common law regimes.203
Professor Buzbee continues:
[I]s there a principled rationale for distinguishing federal
standard setting that set a federal floor or a ceiling? At
first blush, the two appear to be mere flip sides of the
same federal power, only distinguished by their different
regulatory preferences for a world of minimized risk (with
floors) or higher levels of risk (with ceilings) . . . . these
two central regulatory choices are fundamentally differ-
ent. Floors embrace additional and more stringent state
and common law action, while ceilings actually are better
labeled a “unitary federal choice.”204
201 See generally Buzbee, supra note 9; Organ, supra note 9; Engel, supra note 9.
202 Buzbee, supra note 9, at 5.
203 Id. at 6.
204 Id. at 1.
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. . . .
Unitary federal choice ceiling preemption is an institutional
arrangement that threatens to produce poorly tailored regu-
lation and public choice distortions of the political process,
whether it be before the legislature or a federal agency.
Floor preemption, in contrast, constitutes a partial dis-
placement of state choice in setting a minimum level of
protection, but leaves room for other actors and additional
regulatory action. Floors anticipate and benefit from the
institutional diversity they permit.205
With § 108 of H.R. 23, we have an example of what Professor
Buzbee and other legal scholars of federalism and environmental regula-
tion would refer to as federal “ceiling” preemption. That is, H.R. 23 proposes
to prohibit California from relying on sources of California statutory and
common law to impose instream flow and fishery habitat measures more
stringent and protective than federal standards. The standards set forth in
§ 108 of H.R. 23 would constitute, in the words of Professor Buzbee, a “uni-
tary federal choice” in regards to instream flow and fisheries protection
in California.
This “unitary federal choice” approach to California water re-
sources and fisheries would represent a significant departure from the
cooperative federalism approach reflected in § 8 of the Reclamation Act,206
§ 10 of the Federal Power Act,207 and § 401 of the Clean Water Act,208 in
which states have traditionally be given latitude to adopt standards for
instream flow and fisheries protection that are more stringent than
federal standards.
Second, since the November 2016 election that resulted in Repub-
lican control of the White House, the United States Senate, and the United
States House of Representatives, there has been increasing policy discus-
sion of the prospect of a new progressive federalism. In a February 2017
article in The New Republic, titled From California, A Progressive Cry for
State’s Rights, Daniela Blei reported:
205 Id.
206 Federal Reclamation Act, § 8.
207 16 U.S.C. §§ 803(a), (j).
208 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
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It might seem predictable that California, land of liberals,
is leading the charge against the new administration. But
the Golden State is also the birthplace of the modern con-
servative movement and was once an enduring source of
anti-government populism. Decades before California
launched the political careers of Richard Nixon and Ron-
ald Reagan, its business conservatives—agriculture bar-
ons and utility executives—organized in opposition to the
New Deal, purporting to defend citizens from the tyranny
of the federal government . . . In a twist of history, Califor-
nia’s leftist leaders are now embracing state’s rights,
decrying Washington as a threat to a local way of life.209
A leading legal scholar on the concept of new progressive federal-
ism is Professor Heather Gerken who was recently appointed Dean of
Yale Law School.210 In a January 2017 article, Gerken observed: “Pro-
gressives have long thought of federalism as a tool for entrenching the
worst in our politics. But it’s also a tool for changing our politics. Social
movements have long used state and local policymaking as an organizing
tool, a rallying cry, a testing ground for their ideas.”211
Similarly, an August 2017 article in New York Magazine, titled A
New Romance: Trump Has Made Progressives Fall in Love with Federal-
ism, noted:
In the aftermath of the [November 2016] election, [Gerken]
co-authored a user’s guide in the journal Democracy on
how localities can best harness the power of federalism to
serve progressive ends. That’s not to say Democratic en-
claves will necessarily carry this flag for the long haul. In
an interview, she told me that people on both sides of the
political spectrum tend to opportunistically wield federal-
ism for their partisan ends—and not because of some
high-minded constitutional commitment. “Both sides are
209 Daniela Blei, From California, a Progressive Cry for State’s Rights, THE NEW REPUBLIC
(Feb. 14, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/140606/california-progressive-cry-states
-rights [https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://newrepublic.com/article/140606/california
-progressive-cry-states-rights].
210 See generally Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, supra note 10; Gerken, Slipping
the Bonds of Federalism, supra note 10; Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 10.
211 Heather Gerken, We’re About to See State’s Rights Used Defensively Against Trump,
VOX (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/12/12/13915990/federalism
-trump-progressive-uncooperative [https://perma.cc/74LT-FPVF].
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fair-weather federalists. Both sides use it instrumentally
to achieve their goals,” she said.212
Proposals to use California law to keep water instream for fisher-
ies in the face of receding federal law protection are taking place within
the larger policy discussion around new progressive federalism, where
there is a recognition that federalism positions have previously been used
by the political right to undermine efforts to better protect natural re-
sources, and a recognition that if political circumstances change (e.g., when
Democrats are in control of Congress and the White House) they may well
be used in this manner again. This recognition, understandably, creates
some apprehension and caution among progressives about the precedent
they may be establishing in relying on federalism arguments to resist the
policy agenda of the administration of Donald Trump.
CONCLUSION: STATE WATER LAW ADVANCING
With the prospect of federal law and federal agencies potentially
receding from their traditional role in keeping water instream for fisher-
ies, California law and California agencies are well positioned to step in to
fill the void. There is ample state law and ample state government author-
ity to maintain instream flow for California’s fisheries regardless of what
the administration of Donald Trump and the new Congress may do. This
explains why fishery conservation stakeholders, including commercial
fishermen and others whose jobs and income are tied to the health of Califor-
nia’s salmon fishery, may increasingly focus on how to effectively bolster
and deploy California water law to maintain California’s fisheries.213
Increased reliance on California law to keep water instream for
this purpose can perhaps be understood as an example of the new pro-
gressive federalism discussed by Yale Law School Dean Heather Gerken,
although many of the commercial fishermen whose interests are involved
might in fact view such state regulation as more conservative than pro-
gressive.214 Again, as suggested in the introduction to this Article, regu-
lation to preserve jobs in the commercial fishery sector through instream
flow standards does not fit neatly into the right/left political and public
policy categories that often seem to underlie writings on new progressive
federalism.
212 Cristian Farias, A New Romance: Trump Has Made Progressives Fall in Love with Fed-
eralism, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 24, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/08/trump
-has-made-progressives-fall-in-love-with-federalism.html [https://perma.cc/3FS7-W2MQ].
213 Presentations of Zwillinger & Lee, supra note 7.
214 Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, supra note 10, at 1.
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H.R. 23 proposes to limit and displace sources of California water
law that could be used to maintain instream flow for fisheries.215 As such,
H.R. 23 proposes what the legal scholarship on federalism and environ-
mental regulation would categorize as a federal “ceiling” or “unitary
federal choice” which prohibits a state from adopting natural resource
protection standards that are more stringent than federal standards.216
At this point it is uncertain whether H.R. 23 will be enacted into law, but
even if enacted there are indications that H.R. 23 may not survive a legal
challenge.217 In particular, Sections 108(a) and 108(b) of H.R. 23 seek to
prevent the California Department of Water Resources from applying Cali-
fornia water law to the operation of the State Water Project, and seek to
prevent the State Water Resources Control Board from applying Califor-
nia water law to the exercise of entitlements to divert, store and use
surface waters owned by the State of California.218 In this regard, H.R.
23 is venturing into areas of state sovereignty and state self-governance
in which federal preemption claims have not fared well in the courts.219
The experience in California suggests that, in the era of the
administration of Donald Trump and the new Congress, stakeholders
interested in keeping water instream for fisheries need to pay as much
attention to opportunities at the state level as obstacles at the federal
level. That is, in addition to resisting efforts to reduce the role of federal
law and federal agencies in maintaining instream flow, such stake-
holders must also work to strengthen state water law and state water
agencies to maintain instream flow.
The strong assertion and deployment of state water law to main-
tain instream flows for fisheries may in itself be an effective political
strategy to counter efforts to reduce the role of federal law and federal
agencies in ensuring such flows. This assertion and deployment highlight
that, when state water law and state water agencies are available and
ready to plug the holes left when federal water law and federal water agen-
cies retreat, a reduced role for federal law and federal agencies may not
in fact translate into additional water actually becoming available for out-
of-stream diversion and usage. And if that is the case, what is the point
of reducing the role of federal law and federal agencies in the first place?
215 H.R. 23 § 108(a)–(b).
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